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Abstract 
This report reviews the market failure and systems failure rationales for industrial 
policy and assesses the evidence on part experience of industrial policy in the UK.  
In the light of this, it reviews options for reshaping the design and delivery of 
industrial policy towards UK manufacturing.  These options are intended to 
encourage a medium- to long-term perspective across government departments 
and to integrate science, innovation and industrial policy. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper  is concerned with industrial policy. It is not concerned with an 
assessment of current policy. It seeks instead to set out the key principles which 
should guide policy development for the medium to long term. We set out the 
different ways in which industrial policy may be defined and the case for 
governments adopting an industrial policy. We emphasise the policy challenges 
which arise in a world of rapidly developing and potentially transformative new 
technologies and innovation opportunities. We advocate an approach which adopts a 
holistic systems perspective. This approach encompasses policies addressing both 
market and wider system failures and spans the domains of science policy, 
technology policy and innovation policy as integral to a modern industrial policy.  
The proposed approach emphasises both sector and technology specific policy 
domains. It emphasises the particular challenges which arise in designing and 
implementing policy in the specific context of the UK economic system with its 
particular institutional architecture governing product, labour and in particular capital 
markets. 
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2. What is Industrial Policy? 
There currently exists a wide variety of definitions of industrial policy. In their review 
of industrial policy in Europe, Foreman-Peck and Federico (1999) adopt a very broad 
perspective. They define industrial policy as “every form of state intervention that 
affects industry as a distinct part of the economy” (Foreman-Peck and Federico, 
1999, p3). A more focused approach, but still broad in its implications, emphasises 
the structural aspects of industrial policy and the relationship between it and the 
strategic objectives of national governments. Industrial policy is thus a set of 
“structural policies designed to strengthen the efficiency, scale and international 
competitiveness of domestic industrial sectors, typically contains an element of 
national champions, of self-reliance in bringing about growth and development’ 
(Soete, 2007, p273). Similarly, Chang (1994) identifies industrial policy as being 
“aimed at particular industries (and firms as their components) to achieve the 
outcomes that are perceived by the state to be efficient for the economy as a whole” 
(Chang, 1994, p66).  
A helpful and broad recent definition is the following: 
“Industrial policy is any type of intervention or government policy that 
attempts to improve the business environment or to alter the structure of 
economic activity towards sectors, technologies or tasks that are expected 
to offer better prospects for economic growth or societal welfare than would 
occur in the absence of any such intervention ...” 
(Warwick, 2013, pp. 16-17). 
Within industrial policy it has been conventional to distinguish between ‘horizontal’ 
and ‘selective’ industrial policies. The latter are aimed specifically at improving the 
performance of particular industries or firms while the former are designed to benefit 
the economy more generally. However, the distinction is not always clear-cut. For 
example, since sectors differ in their research intensity or their reliance on transport 
infrastructure, ‘horizontal’ policies to encourage R&D or to improve the road network 
will help some more than others. All definitions of industrial policy have at their core a 
concern with economic growth, and especially productivity growth. Productivity 
performance is also central to ‘national competitiveness’ which might be understood 
in terms of achieving economic growth and successful participation in international 
trade. Since manufacturing is more internationally tradable and has achieved higher 
rates of productivity growth than services, industrial policy has often focused on 
support for this sector. The increased vertical spread of business models that bundle 
for example manufacturing activities and service provision means that this focus will 
need to broaden in the years ahead to vertically related value chains. 
 
Long-run productivity performance depends upon decisions to invest, innovate, and 
adopt new technology, which in a market economy will be sensitive to incentive 
structures. This means that a wide range of government actions which comprise 
‘industrial policy’ can potentially have an impact on productivity growth. It also means 
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that science, innovation and technology policy should be seen as closely related to or 
an integral part of industrial policy. In the context of designing a medium to long term 
industrial policy for manufacturing it is important to emphasise the way in which 
technical change and innovation are integrated into policy development. Policy must 
be sufficiently reflexive to respond to unexpected or rapid changes in technical and 
scientific advance affecting the location, structure, scale and nature of the 
manufacturing sector and its links with the wider economy. 
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3. What is the rationale for Industrial 
policy? 
The classic justification for industrial policy in mainstream economics is that it 
remedies market failures, for example, by providing public goods, solving 
coordination problems, or subsidizing activities with positive externalities. For 
example, there is good reason to believe that the social rate of return considerably 
exceeds the private rate of return to R&D and leaving it to the market will mean too 
little R&D. It is quite straightforward to see how arguments of this kind might, in 
principle, be used in favour of ‘horizontal’ industrial policies. 
The case for selective industrial policies has always been more controversial. 
However, the modern mainstream economics literature highlights three arguments in 
their favour, namely: infant-industry related capital market failures, agglomeration 
externalities, and rent-switching under imperfect competition. At the same time, a 
number of pitfalls in the use of such policies have been noted in this literature. 
The ‘infant-industry’ case is for temporary protection of industries which are not 
currently internationally competitive but will be when productivity has improved 
through increasing returns and, in particular, learning by doing. The case for 
intervention really depends on the capital market's inability to finance these activities 
even though they will become privately profitable, perhaps because the learning 
effects accrue to the industry as a whole rather than being firm-specific. A key issue 
is whether the government can credibly commit to the policy intervention being 
temporary. 
The advent of the new economic geography has increased awareness of the 
potential importance of agglomeration benefits which accrue when economic activity 
is characterized by external economies of scale. As city size increases, productivity 
gains can be realized through knowledge spillovers, better availability of intermediate 
inputs and the advantages of a thicker labour pool. Policy interventions may then be 
justified on the grounds of spatial externalities1. In cases where size matters, there 
may be gains from policy interventions that facilitate the expansion of an 
agglomeration or, indeed, the establishment of a successful cluster which obtains 
first-mover advantages. 
The rent-switching argument came to prominence through the work of Brander and 
Spencer (1985). The argument here is that in cases of strategic rivalry in 
international trade, the state can influence entry and exit decisions by offering 
subsidies that result in higher market share for its firm at the expense of a foreign 
rival and redistribute super-normal profits accordingly. Because government values 
objectives other than private profits it may be able credibly to commit to finance entry 
where capital markets cannot. Whether such interventions will succeed may be hard 
to predict, and where their size and/or timing turn out to be inappropriate they may be 
                                            
1
 These are now recognized as examples of the ‘wider economic benefits’ which can accrue from transport projects, see 
Department for Transport (2006). 
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expensive failures. However, Airbus appears to have been a successful example of a 
rent-switching industrial policy; Neven and Seabright (1995) estimated that Airbus 
was likely to produce an acceptable rate of return for Europe over fifty years while at 
the same time reducing Boeing's profits significantly and slightly cutting world-wide 
aircraft prices. That said, Airbus would not be easy to repeat – and was possibly 
illegal under WTO rules. 
An example of an attempt to summarise the wide range of policy instruments based 
on these and related arguments is shown in Exhibit 1. 
Exhibit 1. Examples of Industrial Policy Instruments 
 Horizontal Selective 
Product 
Market 
Competition Policy National Champions 
 Indirect Tax Nationalization/Privatization 
 Product Market Regulation State Aids 
 Exchange Rate Policy Trade Policy 
  Public Procurement 
   
Labour & 
Skills 
Education Policies Targeted Skills Policy 
 Training Subsidies Apprenticeship Policies 
 Wage Subsidies  
 Labour Market Regulation  
 Employment Taxes  
   
Capital Market Corporate Tax Policy State Investment Bank 
 Financial Market Regulation Strategic Investment Fund 
  Emergency Loans 
   
Land Land-Use Planning Rules Place-based Clusters 
Policy 
 Infrastructure Policy Enterprise Zones 
   
Technology R & D Tax Credit Public Procurement 
 Science Budget Patent Box 
 IPR Regime Selective Technology 
Funding 
 
Exhibit 1 is wide-ranging and includes a number of instruments that relate to 
problems facing UK manufacturing. For example, concerns about the absorptive 
capacity of firms with regard to taking advantage of technological opportunities might 
be addressed by policies to improve R&D capabilities; technology funding might be 
focused on helping businesses through the ‘valley of death’; capital market policies 
might target the need for more ‘patient capital’; instruments under the land category 
would be relevant to facilitating agglomeration and co-location of activities and to the 
shortfall in transport infrastructure; skills policies relating to the quality of education 
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and the content of syllabi may need to be designed to address future labour force 
requirements in manufacturing and its value chains etc. 
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4. New Perspectives: Systems, 
Institutional Architecture and Varieties 
of Capitalism 
Current thinking and policy possibilities go beyond traditional market-failure 
arguments to embrace notions of ‘systems failure’, especially with regard to 
innovation and technical change. A systems approach focuses on coordination 
problems in the context of promoting the development, awareness and exploitation of 
new technological opportunities. The old approach to selective industrial policy 
identified sectors or firms to support but this new approach is based on selecting new 
ideas as they emerge from the science base or working back from sectoral problem-
solving and technical challenges to the science base. Whereas the old vocabulary 
was about ‘picking winners’, the new terminology is that of ‘choosing races and 
placing bets’ (Hughes, 2012).  
There are certain core elements of a systems approach, typically three are identified 
(Edquist, 2005). The first consists of the agents operating within the particular system 
domain (e.g. country, region, or sector). This includes not only private sector 
consumers and businesses, but also the public sector in its various manifestations 
and the third (or charitable) not-for-profit sector. Private sector firms in the system 
identify commercially attractive opportunities and devise business models to exploit 
them. In doing this they must invest human and financial capital and a wide range of 
intangible assets including R&D, design and ICT. A firm’s investment in R&D both 
generates new knowledge and increases capacity to absorb ideas from external 
sources (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The second element is usually defined as 
“institutions” which are not to be understood as organisations or entities, but rather as 
the norms of conduct or rules of the game, including contractual legal and regulatory 
systems within which agents operate. The third element is usually defined in terms of 
the connections between agents. This will include, but is not restricted to, market 
connections. System connections include a wide variety of non-market relationships 
including collaborative and formal and informal interpersonal and inter-organisational 
networking connections. There may be significant variations across sectors, regions, 
technological trajectories and national systems in the strength, nature and variety of 
connections and their interplay with institutional differences (Lundvall, 2007).  
The institutions and connections may be thought of as defining the “institutional 
architecture” within which the agents operate. This institutional architecture may then 
be used to characterise differences between national systems, their patterns of co-
ordination and the way they impinge on the ability of private sector firms to identify 
and exploit business opportunities. This architecture will affect both the nature of 
systems failures and the feasibility and effectiveness of “traditional” policy measures 
applied in different systems (Dodgson et al, 2011; Edquist, 2005; Lundvall, 2007, 
Nelson, 1993). This is related to the concept of “varieties of capitalism” which has 
been used to suggest that the nature of investment will differ significantly between 
countries (Hall and Soskice, 2001) (see Exhibits 2-4). In relation to investment 
generally, and R&D in particular, it has been argued that the UK variety of liberal 
market capitalism inhibits long-term investment compared with more coordinated 
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varieties exemplified by Germany and Japan (Dore, 2000). Impatient capital markets 
driven by an over-concern with short-term movements in stock market prices, the 
threat of takeover, and arms-length relationships between the providers and users of 
finance, serves to promote short-termism in investment decisions (Haldane and 
Davies, 2011; Kay, 2012; Hughes, 2013). System architecture may also alter the 
nature of innovation by inhibiting incremental innovation. Impatient capital markets 
may be complementary to labour markets focused on hire and fire relationships which 
inhibit more stable labour contracts that foster investment in firm specific training and 
skills (Exhibit 2).  
11 
 
 
Exhibit 2      Varieties of Capitalism 
The highly influential ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach to the analysis of economic policy and 
performance was originally developed by Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001). The core of the 
approach is based on a comparison between 2 ideal types, the co-ordinated market economy (CME) 
and the liberal market economy (LME), which comprise different environments in which firms 
operate. In the real world, the purest cases of the CME and the LME are Germany and the United 
States, respectively. Each of these economies can be thought of as having a different set of 
complementary institutions and, as a corollary of this, different comparative advantages in 
production, trade, human capital formation, and innovation. 
The relevant aspects of these ideal types with regard to  firms concern corporate governance, 
education and training, interactions with other firms, and industrial relations. Exhibit 3 illustrates the 
institutional complementarities that Hall and Soskice (2001) highlight as key characteristics of, 
respectively, the German CME and the American LME. As these diagrams suggest, the idea is that 
the value of one institution is enhanced by the presence of the others.  
It should also be noted that the policies appropriate to each type of economy differ; for example, 
well-designed competition policy is a much more important attribute for the LME. A further dimension 
not shown here but emphasized by Cusack et al. (2010) is that CMEs (LMEs) ] are found in 
countries whose elections are based on proportional representation (majoritarian system). Given the 
interlocking nature of these institutional configurations it might be that they tend to be persistent such 
that countries do not readily switch from LME to CME or vice versa. 
Hall and Soskice (2001) argued that CMEs would be relatively strong at ‘incremental innovation’ 
marked by continuous, small-scale improvements to existing product lines and production processes 
while LMEs would be more successful at ‘radical innovation’ which entails substantial shifts in 
product lines, the development of new goods or major changes to the production process. In terms 
of international trade, LMEs would have revealed comparative advantage in high-tech sectors based 
on tertiary human capital and CMEs would specialize in sophisticated engineering products requiring 
the deployment of long-term patient capital and a highly-skilled cooperative labour force. 
A further major implication of varieties of capitalism is that CMEs with proportional representation 
and centralized wage bargaining will sustain relatively large shares of the workforce and superior 
international competitiveness (lower relative unit labour costs) in exportable manufacturing i.e. will 
be less exposed to de-industrialization of employment (Iversen and Soskice, 2010). The argument is 
that institutional arrangements in these economies will deliver high levels of training combined with 
wage restraint. 
Subsequent empirical work has tried both to test how far economies correspond to these ideal types 
and whether these predictions about comparative advantages are confirmed by the evidence. This is 
clearly work in progress but some empirical support has been found. Schneider and Paunescu 
(2012) find that there are several intermediate varieties of capitalism, but that there are some ‘pure’ 
CMEs and LMEs. These have institutional configurations that are perfect mirror images of each 
other. The LME is characterized by lower employment protection, shorter average employment 
tenure, lower collective bargaining coverage, less occupational training and more university training, 
more cross-border mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances, and greater stock market 
capitalization than the CME. They also find that countries can and do move between varieties 
(Exhibit 4). However, the UK as an LME and Germany as a CME match these profiles in a stable 
way. 
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Exhibit 3        Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies: Complementarities across sub-systems in Germany and the USA 
Complementarities across subsystems in the German coordinated market 
economy 
Complementarities across subsystems in the American liberal market 
economy 
Corporate governance 
systems, permitting LR 
finance without publicly 
assessable information, 
using reputational 
monitoring
Education and training 
system which permits 
sunk human capital 
investments in firms 
and sometimes defined 
industries
Industrial-relations 
system which 
provides employee 
cooperation in 
companies and 
wage moderation
Certification 
helps assess 
company 
viability
LR finance allows 
credible 
commitments to 
LR security by 
employers
Allows 
consensus 
decision-
making
Company 
needs
Cooperation 
between companies 
needed to allow 
reputational 
monitoring
Allows credible
commitment 
to long-run 
relations 
between                
companies
Co-determination 
provides way to bring 
profitability needs 
into consensus 
decision-making
Provides common ind.
Tech. skills needed for 
cooperation based on 
common standard
Reduces 
temptation 
to poach
Product market 
cooperation lowers 
external labour 
market competition
Reduces 
risk of sunk 
investment
Skilled 
employees 
in powerful 
position in 
companies
System of inter-
company relations 
allows cooperation 
standard-setting and 
technology transfer
 
Education and training 
system permitting 
investments in general 
skills
Lack of sunk training 
investments 
reinforces market for 
corporate control
Credible 
commitment 
difficult for LR 
rational sunk 
investments in 
training
Company 
competing in 
rapidly 
changing 
markets
Difficult to use other 
companies to 
monitor inside 
information
Credible 
commitment 
difficult for LR 
relational sunk
investments 
between 
companies
Unilateral control 
reinforces market in 
corporate control; and 
allows owners to set 
high-powered 
incentives
Permits mobility and 
retraining
Permits tech.
diffusion via
high-skill
Labour 
mobility
Product market 
instability reinforces 
labour market 
deregulation
Disincentive 
for sunk   
cost 
training
Permits 
mobility and 
retraining
Short-run finance 
prevents power 
bases developing 
among 
employees
Deregulated labour 
markets, low-cost 
hiring and firing, no 
co-determination 
rights, flexible 
reward-setting
Finance available on 
publicly assessable 
information, all risks, 
reputations if publicly 
assessable; inside info, only 
if monitorable, e.g. by 
venture capitalists
Strong competition policy; 
standard-setting via 
market competition; 
technology transfer via 
market (incl. alliances, 
rjvs, hires)
 
Note: LR = Long Run, rjvs = relationship-based joint ventures 
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Exhibit 4 Varieties of Capitalism, 1990-2005 
Cluster 1990 1999 2005 
State-dominated 
economies 
TURKEY TURKEY PORTUGAL 
 ITALY PORTUGAL GREECE 
 SPAIN GREECE TURKEY 
 Belgium SPAIN  
 GREECE   
    
Coordinated Market 
Economies 
Austria Austria Austria 
 Germany Czech Republic Belgium 
 Denmark Italy Germany 
 Finland FRANCE FRANCE 
 Sweden Germany  
 FRANCE Belgium  
 Netherlands   
    
Hybrid economies Norway South Korea Poland 
 Japan Poland ITALY 
  Hungary Norway 
  Norway Czech 
Republic 
  Japan Hungary 
   South Korea 
   Japan 
    
Liberal Market-like 
economies 
Australia Denmark Spain 
 New Zealand Sweden Finland 
 Rep. of 
Ireland 
 Netherlands 
 Switzerland  Sweden 
   Australia 
   Rep. of 
Ireland 
   New Zealand 
    
Liberal Market 
Economies 
Canada Switzerland Switzerland 
 USA Finland Denmark 
 UK Rep. of Ireland UK 
  New Zealand Canada 
  Canada USA 
  Australia  
  Netherlands  
  UK  
  USA  
Notes:  Bold: economies discussed as CMEs by Hall and Soskice;  
Italics:  economies discussed as LMEs by Hall and Soskice 
CAPITALISED: economies discussed as Mediterranean by Hall and Soskice 
Source: Derived from Schneider and Paunescu (2012) Table 1, p.10. 
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4.1 Varieties of Capitalism: Radical vs. Incremental innovation: 
An unhelpful distinction? 
In the wider innovation literature radical innovations are most often defined in terms of 
fundamental shifts in the relationship of performance to price in the development of new 
industries, products or processes, and/or the pervasiveness of their effects across 
sectors. They are also linked to fundamental organisational changes within firms as well 
as between them. Radical innovations are, however, also frequently associated with 
subsequent long processes of incremental innovation within the firms and sectors where 
they occur. This makes simple binary classifications of sectors questionable (Fagerberg, 
2005; Verspagen, 2005; Powell and Grodal, 2005; Sorescu et al., 2003; McDermott and 
O’Connor, 2002).  
Salter and Alexy (2013) provide a useful overview of this area. They point out that where 
attempts have been made to measure the frequency of radical innovations, it appears 
that they may take decades to develop and are extremely infrequent, maybe occurring 
once in every three decades (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986; McDermott and O’Connor, 2002). The implication is that in the average industry 
firms may operate and workers may work their entire lives without ever experiencing a 
radical innovation. Moreover, it appears that such innovations are best thought of as not 
specific to certain sectors and therefore not easily revealed in patterns of relative 
comparative advantage across sectors. Instead they are pervasive across many sectors 
i.e. they are what are known as general purpose technologies (Helpman, 1998).  
It also appears to be the case that appropriating the value from radical innovations when 
they do occur depends critically upon the ability to implement and develop competitive 
strategies around substantial investment in incremental innovation. This has led to the 
emergence of a substantial literature on sectoral systems of innovation. This eschews 
simple twofold binary distinctions between sectors and their innovation systems. Instead 
it favours a more granular approach emphasising inter alia the interplay between 
technological opportunity and appropriability conditions (i.e. how value is captured by 
businesses). It also emphasises the way in which the nature of a sectoral system and 
the types of innovation it embodies can vary over time (Malerba, 2004 and 2005). 
Competition and competitive advantage shifts from ‘radical’ product innovation to 
‘incremental’ product and process competition over a sector life cycle (Utterback, 1994). 
This has more to do with the maturity of a sector than its ‘high-tech’ status. It is also 
apparent that innovation in general is increasingly influenced by the pursuit of open 
collaborative and networked models. Rather than emphasising a contrast between 
liberal markets and coordinated markets this suggests a cross national move towards 
more inter-firm collaboration arguments (Chesborough, 2003 and 2006). When more 
direct measures of innovation outputs rather than indirect measure such as patents are 
used, it appears that company level variables dominate, with few signs of country effects 
(see, for example, Tellis et al., 2009). Moreover as Aoki (2010) argues it appears 
increasingly that similar business ‘architectures’ are emerging in the world’s leading 
businesses which are global in character rather than defined by national boundaries. He 
provides an overview of relevant changes in Japan.2 Finally, other organisational and 
networked based approaches have argued that the tight interconnections in coordinated 
economies such as Japan and Korea have been central in the past to their ability to 
                                            
2
 See also Streeck (2009) and Carlin (2009) more generally.  
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outperform US firms in radical innovation rather than inhibit them (Aoki, 1988; Hager 
and Hollingsworth, 2000, Nonakka and Konno, 1998). Furthermore, an examination of 
detailed sector patterns of, for example, patenting (as we have shown above) reveal that 
even taking these patent proxies at face value, CME economies in many cases 
demonstrate comparative advantages in radical as opposed to incremental innovation 
(see, for example, the detailed discussion in Akkermans et al., 2009). 
There is also abundant evidence to suggest that sectors which are classified as low-tech 
are also characterised by innovations of a transformative or radical kind (see, for 
example, the discussion in Von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005). A particularly striking 
example here is the role of information technology in transforming business models and 
productivity in the United States in particular, as well as in other economies.  
4.2 Varieties of Capitalism and Industrial Policy 
A danger inherent in any analysis which characterises varieties of capitalism as 
consisting of a given set of structures observed at a point or period in time is that it can 
neglect the analysis of the way in which institutions evolve and change. As Hall and 
Gingerich (2009) point out, different varieties of capitalism can have embedded in them 
factors which will predispose systems to react to shocks in ways which are consistent 
with the established beliefs and practices of the firms and workers in those economies. 
Thus in response to an external shock a liberal market economy, it is hypothesised, will 
seek to pursue even more liberal market policies by more deregulation. On the other 
hand, in coordinated market economies the reverse is posited to be true. In thinking 
about the next 30 years, the question is whether liberal market economies such as the 
UK will be better served by more of the same or by an attempt to alter structural 
characteristics which inhibit the future development of the economy.  
This is precisely the area in which the debate about industrial policy is now being 
conducted. It should lead to a fundamental re-examination of the way in which 
intermediate coordinating organisations can be created in LME varieties of capitalism. 
Current industrial policy debates emphasise the need to develop strategies around the 
allocation of resources to strategic sectors. Insofar as those sectors and technologies 
involve the accretion and consolidation of wide ranges of knowledge and expertise then 
the development of institutions (e.g. catapult centres (TSB, 2011) which have the 
potential to assist in these connections, become a central part of industrial policy.  
The great interest in such intermediate institutions in the UK (and the USA) at present 
indicates the extent to which this message is being absorbed into industrial policy 
debates. Economies characterised as liberal market economies and coordinated market 
economies each contain within them sectors which are characterised as experiencing 
both radical and incremental innovation. This means that a view will need to be taken on 
a much more granular basis of the particular factors likely to inhibit or encourage 
innovation in each sector. Basing policy on an aggregated view of how the economy 
looks on average, or on its inherited structure from the past is not helpful. 
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5. Market Failures and System Failures 
The mainstream market failure arguments we have set out earlier provide important 
rationales for public sector intervention, but rarely provide sufficient guidance for the 
degree of intervention in particular instances or different systems; nor do they address 
the many other potential institutional and connection failures which may arise when a 
systems based approach is adopted.3 System failures can arise from various sources. 
Transition and lock-in problems, for example, arise from inertia due to substantial sunk 
investment by private and public sectors in existing or dominant technologies. These are 
linked to transition failures in moving to new technological structures which pose major 
problems of investment and business reorganisation (e.g. in the switch to low carbon 
vehicles (HMG, 2008; King, 2008). Then there are institutional system failures arising 
from a lack of congruence between formal and informal rules and incentives affecting 
different parts of the organisation of the system. A particularly prominent case is the 
alleged difference in norms and incentives between academic scientists and the private 
sector in conducting research. Here it is argued that the former emphasise open 
publication and disclosure, whilst the private sector, in its pursuit of research connected 
to private exploitation, is committed to secrecy and patent protection. This has 
engendered a major debate in the UK over the extent to which the allocation of public 
funds should be directed according to the motivations and the incentives of the former 
as compared to the latter, the nature of UK university-industry links, and the design of 
intermediary organisations on the boundaries of universities and industry (Royal 
Society, 2011; Hughes, 2012; Hauser, 2010; Mina et al., 2009; Deiaco et al., 2012; 
Hughes and Kitson, 2012). 
One of the most important implications arising from the development of more systemic 
views has been the emphasis placed upon the development of demand side as well as 
supply side policies in addressing lock in and transition problems and uncertainties. This 
is based around the potential role of the public sector as a procurer of R&D. More 
specifically, it emphasises the role of public procurement in influencing the scale, 
direction and form of the provision of the goods and services it purchases (Edquist et al., 
2000; OECD, 2010a; Connell and Probert, 2010). Public procurement is then seen as a 
potentially important innovation policy device for reducing uncertainty in areas where 
lead user activities are important. Public procurement can also be seen as 
complementary to supply side measures linked to standard market failure arguments 
which, through taxation and subsidy, influence the relative prices at which businesses 
conduct their innovation related activities (OECD, 2010b).  
                                            
3
 See, for example, Metcalfe (2005), Dodgson et al., (2011), BIS (2011) and for a comparison of systems and market 
failures, Chaminade and Edquist (2010).  
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6. Innovation Systems, Institutional 
Architecture and Diffusion 
An important aspect of productivity growth is the effective assimilation of new 
technology across the system. This highlights the importance of industrial policies in 
terms of their impact on the speed of diffusion of innovations. As is widely recognized, 
policy can impact on lags in diffusion through provision of information and the 
improvement of market and non-market connections between firms and other agents. 
This includes information which as a public good may be subject to market failure. 
Beyond this, however, it is important also to think about the determinants of technology 
diffusion in terms of absorptive capacity of firms and the profitability of adoption, as is 
proposed by probit models (Geroski, 2000), both of which may be influenced by 
industrial policy. 
Absorptive capacity entails the ability to search for, evaluate, assimilate, and exploit 
knowledge. This is underpinned by education and skills but also by investments in 
intangible capital including crucially R&D (Griffith et al., 2004) but also economic 
competences including training, flexibility in use of business models, effective 
cooperation with research organizations, and organizational capabilities etc (Harris and 
Moffat, 2013). This offers a wide range of possibilities for both horizontal and selective 
industrial policy potentially to make a difference by focusing on increasing firms’ 
absorptive capacity. More generally, the adoption of a new technology depends on the 
net present value of investment. This can also be affected by the business environment, 
for example how costly and time-consuming it is to invest in a start-up firm, 
environmental regulations, tax rules etc. 
Diffusion of new technologies may also be inhibited where system lock-ins occur due to 
the strength of major sunk investments supporting existing technologies e.g. electric v 
petrol driven automobiles. Here sector based selective industrial policies may include 
the use of demonstrator or pilot plants and public procurement.  
Some of these points can be illustrated by a notable recent success for the UK, namely, 
the relatively rapid diffusion of ICT which illustrates the value of the probit model of 
diffusion as well as the importance of horizontal industrial policy. The contribution of 
investment in ICT to growth of labour productivity over 1995-2005 was about twice as 
large in the United States and the UK compared with France or Germany (Timmer et al., 
2010). ICT diffusion has been influenced by the absorptive capacity of firms, in particular 
investments in intangibles such as organizational capital and the quality of the labour 
force, but also by the profitability of investment in ICT capital which has a bigger 
productivity payoff if it is accompanied by organizational change in working practices 
and is therefore encouraged by low adjustment costs. Neither high employment 
protection nor product market regulation that inhibits the entry of new firms is conducive 
to a strong contribution of ICT to economic growth. The diffusion of ICT in the UK has 
been promoted by the relatively light-regulation environment and by the expansion of 
higher education (Conway, 2007). However, it is also important to recognize that 
management practices matter as well and in the case of IT appear to be a crucial part of 
absorptive capacity (Hughes and Scott Morton, 2006). In the UK context, Bloom et al. 
(2012) show that American-owned multinationals have used IT more effectively than 
either domestic firms or other multinationals. On a European-wide basis, these authors 
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find that this same pattern emerges and that the key advantage of the American 
multinationals lies in people-management practices. 
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7. Innovation Systems, Institutional 
Architecture and the UK variety of 
Capitalism 
The UK share of capital investment in output has been low relative to competitor 
economies for many decades and continues to be so, both for the whole economy and 
for manufacturing. The growth rate of the fixed capital stock was negative for the period 
2000-07. The growth of capital per worker in manufacturing has been about the average 
of competitor countries. Investment since the financial crisis has been particularly poor 
both absolutely and in comparison with competitor countries. Business investment 
remains around 20% below where it would have been had it continued to grow at its pre-
2008 average rate and projections for investment growth in the next four years are 
around 6%, little more than half that forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility in 
late 2012. 
7.1 Investment in R&D  
As with overall investment the UK has occupied a relatively weak and worsening position 
in terms of the overall R&D effort. This is a characteristic of manufacturing R&D spend 
as well as of the overall business R&D spend. The UK’s R&D effort, especially in the 
manufacturing sector, is hugely reliant on overseas funding and also is carried out 
disproportionately by the subsidiaries of overseas organisations located in the UK. The 
vast bulk of R&D is carried out by a relatively small number of large firms and compared 
to other countries is relatively concentrated in high technology sectors (Hughes, 2013; 
Driffield, 2013).  
7.2 Finance and Short-termism 
There is substantial qualitative and quantitative evidence of short termist influences on 
investment decision taking in the UK (Hughes, 2013). These influences have increased 
over time. Survey based approaches show evidence of significant proportions of 
managers holding perceptions of short-term pressures especially in capital intensive 
sectors with long gestation periods. Econometric estimates for samples of non-financial 
companies in the period 1980-88 suggested that cash flows accruing six months in the 
future are underestimated by 5% relative to non-myopic discounting. Cash flows which 
do not accrue for five years are underestimated by almost 40%. The latest estimates 
for a large combined sample of US and UK firms covering the last 20 years suggest 
that short-termist influences have increased in importance since the 1980s (Haldane 
and Davies, 2011). 
The UK variety of capitalism is heavily reliant on the use of internal cash flows to fund 
investment. Equity markets have not played a substantial role in funding new 
investment. Instead they have served as a vehicle for high levels of mergers and 
acquisitions and intense short term performance monitoring and corporate governance 
(Hughes, 2013). As a result cash flow is, for example, positively related to investment in 
R&D intensive firms in the UK (Bond et al., 2003). Shareholder value-enhancing 
corporate governance characteristics in the UK have had a negative impact on the 
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propensity to invest in long-term R&D projects. They have enhanced the 
responsiveness of corporate strategy to short-term expectation of financial markets with 
detrimental effects on long-term R&D investments. This is not the case in Germany 
which has a bank based financial system engendering long term relationship which is 
conducive to investment to R&D intensive businesses. British firms that do engage in 
R&D are a self-selected group, with significantly better cash flow and where financing 
constraints tend to be less binding (Bond et al., 2003). 
International comparative studies show that stronger shareholder protection is 
associated with larger stock market capitalisation, but also with lower innovative activity 
(Honoré et al., 2011). These results imply a weaker performance for the UK driven by 
its financial system. International comparisons also show that widely held businesses 
tend to have higher R&D activity than family controlled businesses. This effect is 
however much weaker in the UK than in other European countries. This may reflect the 
absence of large block shareholders in the UK to act as a buffer against short-term 
performance pressures in its more dispersed market based governance systems 
(Munari et al., 2010).  
Knowledge intensive SMEs in technology intensive industries continue to be 
constrained by a lack of early stage finance in the UK .The UK has the largest venture 
capital market outside the USA in absolute terms. It invests relatively little in early stage 
investments, and is sensitive to stock market volatility (Hughes, 2013). It is also the 
most international venture capital market with a relatively low weight of investment in 
the home country. Whereas around 60% of funds in the UK have some investment 
outside the UK, only one third of German funds invest outside that country (Mayer et 
al., 2005).  
7.3 Systems thinking, Industrial Policy and the future for the 
UK variety of Capitalism 
In thinking about the next 30 years, the question is whether a “liberal market economy” 
such as the UK will be better served by more of the same or by an attempt to alter 
structural characteristics, which inhibit the future development of the economy. This is 
precisely the area in which the debate about industrial policy is now being conducted. It 
should lead to a fundamental re-examination of the way in which intermediate 
coordinating organisations can themselves be created in economies, such as the UK, 
which lack them. It should also lead to a continued emphasis on the role of public 
procurement of R&D as an essential way of supporting early stage growth in knowledge 
intensive manufacturing SMEs. Whilst systems thinking is now used extensively to 
analyse innovation policy, it is not reflected explicitly in the current policy debate over the 
empirical or conceptual basis for industrial policy, although there has been some attempt 
to develop industrial policy thinking in the light of innovation studies (e.g. Bianchi and 
Labory, 2006). 
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8. Science Policy, Technology Policy, 
Innovation Policy and Industrial Policy 
There have been a number of attempts to distinguish between science policy, 
technology policy and innovation policy. It is useful to discuss this before turning to their 
link with industrial policy. 
Exhibit 5  A Typology of Policy Domains 
Science policy
Focus: Production of scientific knowledge
Instruments:
•Public research funds granted in competition
• (Semi-) Public research institutions (i.e.: 
laboratories, universities, research centres…)
•Tax incentives to firms
•High education
• Intellectual property rights
Innovation Policy
Focus: Overall innovative performance of the 
economy
Instruments:
• Improving individual skills and learning abilities 
(through general education system and labour 
training)
• Improving organisational performance and 
learning (i.e. ISO 9000 standards, quality control, 
etc.)
• Improving access to information: Information 
society
•Environmental regulation
•Bioethical regulation
•Corporate law
•Competition regulations
•Consumer protection
• Improving social capital for regional development: 
Clusters and industrial districts
• Intellectual bench marking
• Intelligent, reflexive and democratic forecasting
Technology policy
Focus: Advancement and commercialisation of 
sectoral technical knowledge
Instruments:
•Public procurement
•Public aid to strategic sectors
•Bridging institutions (between research world and 
industry)
•Labour force training and improvement of 
technical skills
•Standarisation
•Technology forecasting
•Benchmarking industrial sectors
 
Source: Lundvall and Borrás (2005) 
Exhibit 5 shows a useful recent typology. The focus of science policy is on the 
production of scientific knowledge. The instruments associated with it are focused on 
the role of public research funding, tax incentives to firms, higher education and the role 
of intellectual property rights in relation to accessing the public knowledge base. 
Technology policy is seen as more concerned in advancing towards the 
commercialisation stage and in their classification is linked to sectoral bases for 
technical knowledge. In this domain public procurement, strategic action in relation to 
selective sectors, the development of bridging institutions, technology forecasting, 
benchmarking and standardisation all play an important role. Innovation policy is then 
seen as moving to more overall performance aspects and is linked to a set of 
“institutional architecture” arrangements operating at that level. These cover a wide 
range of skill and organisational based activities, information flows and regulation in 
relation to a wide range of environmental corporate and competition policy areas as well 
as consumer protection. This aggregation here is not at the level of sectors, but may 
include the development of geographically focused policy instruments. 
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In their analysis of the basis for policy in the science, technology and innovation policy 
domains Lundvall and Borrás draw the familiar distinction from a systems perspective 
between a neo-classical economic approach which focuses on market failures and a 
systems based approach. In the latter a critical step is made by recognising that pure 
arm’s length and anonymous relationships between producers and users is logically 
incompatible with what they regard as the ‘real’ world of markets. In that world markets 
are organised and “constitute frameworks for interactive learning between users and 
producers” (Lundvall and Borrás, 2005, p613). They point out that there is a strong 
overlap between the instruments of intervention, in particular as the analysis moves 
from technology policy towards innovation policy.  
In moving on to industrial policy, work based on sectoral and technological systems is 
central.  
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9. Sectoral Systems 
In a study of six sectoral systems of innovation (SSI), Malerba (2004) concludes that 
“the principle role of the policy maker is to facilitate the self-organisation of the SSIs 
within the relative policy domain. An important consequence of this is that the policy-
making process is itself the reflection of bounded rationality and learning in the presence 
of high heterogeneity in technical change and the innovation process. The sectoral 
system approach is an alternative to the concept of the optimising policy-maker, which 
characterises the market failure approach to innovation policy …” (Malerba, 2004, 
pp500-501).  
An important insight of the sectoral systems approach is that innovation systems 
operate at multiple levels and within and across national economies and technologies. 
Each sectoral system therefore forms an intersection of different networks generating 
particular kinds of knowledge. The policy-maker therefore is faced not with the problem 
of analysing market failures per se, but system failures in terms of the interrelationship 
between the various sources of knowledge and the actors involved in the sectoral 
system. Thus “sectoral analyses should focus on the systemic features of innovation in 
relation to knowledge and boundaries, the heterogeneity of actors and networks, 
institutions, and transformation through co-evolutionary processes. As a consequence, 
the understanding of these dimensions becomes a prerequisite for any policy addressed 
to a specific sector.” (Malerba, 2004, pp501-502).  
Adopting this approach emphasises the need to see any policy towards the sectoral 
system of innovation linked to the broad range of other policy domains in which 
government may attempt to operate, including science policy, industrial policy and 
competition policy. The policy-maker needs to take into account the geographical 
boundaries which may differ across sectoral systems of local, national and international 
actors and institutions. This implies a granular approach to the formation of sector 
policies of which innovation policy per se is only one component.  
Malerba (2004) concludes that “in general, if governments should intervene, they should 
do so at an early stage in the development of new sub-systems and new SSIs. Such 
intervention at an early stage may have a tremendous impact.” Finally, Malerba (2004) 
notes, that the costs of creating the knowledge base for understanding the emergence 
and development of sectoral systems of innovation are substantial and frequently cross 
the standard industrial classifications which define sectors in most sets of national and 
industrial accounts. 
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10. Technological Systems 
A technological system may be defined as “a network or networks of agents interacting 
in a specific technology area under a particular institutional infrastructure to generate, 
diffuse and utilise technology. Technological systems are defined in terms of knowledge 
or competence flows rather than flows of ordinary goods and services. They consist of 
dynamic knowledge and competence networks.” (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997, 
p.268). Whilst recognising that technological systems may be international in character, 
they argue that they are likely to have very strong national, regional or local dimensions. 
Technological systems failures may arise from lock-in problems as firms, institutions and 
networks become tied into old technologies. Similarly, the accumulated absorptive 
capacity of firms may limit or shape their research processes to focus on relatively 
localised knowledge and related sectors. A central policy issue is to what extent 
innovation should be concerned with improving the efficiency of existing systems as 
opposed to building new systems. In the first case policies are essentially concerned 
with creating bridging institutions and other activities to strengthen an existing system 
with an emphasis on enhanced diffusion of best practice. In the second case the object 
of the policy would be the development of processes to create diversity and, as 
Carlsson and Jacobsson put it, “to build options in the sense of stimulating and 
protecting technological and institutional diversity and by enhancing industry’s 
awareness of new technology”. (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997, p.270).  
In relation to networks as part of the technological system, important government policy 
functions may be related to matching firms within a technological system that have 
currently good contact or linking separated actors, such as universities and researchers. 
Finally, the behaviour of different “agents” and institutional architectures (educational 
organisations, and in particular universities, as well as the role and nature of the 
financial system) may also play a critical role.  
The evolution of systems may span several decades. From a policy point of view the 
question of the stage of development of the technological system is critically important in 
relation to the extent and nature of policy interventions. As with SSI, policy may be most 
effective in the early stages of the evolution of the technological system. Diversity 
should be the prime policy objective. A fundamental role for the policy-maker is then 
identified as being to raise awareness of new technological opportunities. This imposes 
a major knowledge gathering and opportunity identification role for policy-makers to 
either coordinate or fulfil. Secondly, for awareness to lead to action requires a 
combination of lead customers and financing, and access to these may vary across 
national boundaries. There is an important role for the university sector in identifying 
new technologies and spinning off firms exploiting that technology.  
In each of these domains industrial policy may have an important role to play. This may 
be as a direct lead procurer through advanced purchase itself and/or through the 
shaping of policies to encourage knowledge exchange between the university and 
industrial sectors. Finally, interventions to promote new directions in technology systems 
are unlikely to be marginal. They are likely to require substantive investments and policy 
will require a strong element of anticipating change. This requires a system for the early 
identification of potential new directions and potential systems failings in their 
development.  
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11. The Design of System-based Industrial 
Policy 
The sectoral systems and technological systems approaches reveal the importance of 
policy design as much as policy instruments per se. The bureaucratic and informational 
constraints on the exercise of industrial policy should not be taken as given. Three key 
elements to the design of industrial policy may be identified (Rodrik, 2006). 
The first of these is “embeddedness” (Rodrik, 2006). Industrial policy development 
needs to be embedded in private sector networks and hence be able to draw upon and 
connect with and between information sources in that sector. This is a characterisation 
of policy which stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream top down economics model 
in which the government as a ‘principal’ designs a rule to provide incentives to the 
private sector as ‘agents’. The agents are then expected to respond and act in a socially 
desirable manner (typically in the resolution of “market failures”). This approach takes 
the information asymmetry and lack of connections as given. Autonomous bureaucrats 
incentivise agents to respond to the “altered” market signals. This model is 
counterproductive in the context of industrial policy (Rodrik, 2006). In practice, “the 
government has only a vague idea at the outset about whether a set of activities is 
deserving of support or not, what instruments to use, and what kind of private sector 
behaviour to condition these instruments on. The information that needs to flow from the 
private sector to the government in order to make the appropriate decisions on these 
are multidimensional and cannot be communicated transparently through firms’ actions 
alone. A thicker bandwidth is needed.” (Rodrik, 2006, p.26).  
This approach occupies the ground between the view of the autonomous industrial 
policy-maker of the neo-classical economic approach and the private capture, and 
suborning, of industrial policy makers by private enterprise emphasised in the “political 
economy” critique of coordinated selective planning approaches to industrial policy. It 
entails “strategic collaboration and coordination between the private sector and the 
government” (Rodrik, 2006, p.2). This needs to be designed to uncover significant 
bottlenecks and constraints, the design of effective interactions as well as of 
evaluations. It also critically involves learning from mistakes as the policy evolves. A 
wide range of institutional developments may serve this purpose from informal and 
formal development forums through to advisory councils and intermediating Research 
and Technology Organisations. From this perspective industrial policy is a process of 
learning and discovery. This approach is entirely consistent with the emphasis on policy 
learning in the innovation systems literature. 
The second feature of institutional design is the necessity of combining sticks with 
carrots so that there are not only incentives, but also disincentives based on the 
weeding out of investments that fail or activities that become “honourable dead-ends” 
(Rodrik, 2006). The designation of industrial policy as a process of discovery means that 
policy makers and the political system must accept a failure rate consistent with the 
underlying riskiness of the activity being supported. These carrots and sticks need to be 
combined with full public accountability for the sums dispersed and the performance of 
the investment or activity supported under the industrial policy.  
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The sectoral and technological systems approaches both emphasise the potential role 
of industrial policy support at the earlier stages of systems formation. The impact of 
learning and of increased knowledge sharing and coordination at this stage is also 
emphasised. These relationships and their implications may also be important at the 
more mature phase of a sector’s development in the phase of changing underlying 
demand or competence or resource based constraints. Moreover, once new 
specialisations are developed there may remain obstacles to sufficient subsequent 
investment in resources to develop them.  
If a particular economy is not able to attract sufficiently skilled and capable resources, 
either in terms of financial or human capital, then industrial policy may need to be 
concerned with the design of ways to promote the role of users to pull through and 
stimulate innovation in emerging upstream developments (Arora and Gambardella, 
2006). This point is intimately related to the role that industrial policy may play in 
stimulating multiple partners to take part in development processes, arising from early 
stage technological breakthroughs, as technologies emerge into potential 
commercialisable opportunities. It is important to note in this connection that the 
absence of venture capital funding in early stage developments may place an even 
greater emphasis on the role of early stage lead users and in particular the role of the 
public sector as a lead user procurement mechanism (Connell and Probert, 2010).  
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12. From Science Policy through to 
Industrial Policy 
In the light of the foregoing discussion about the implications of developing a selective 
industrial policy and the need for careful policy design, an attempt is made in Exhibit 6 to 
encompass the key elements in policy design. Exhibit 6 takes the view that the term 
“industrial policy” is best conceived in a granular context, in relation to the specific 
technology or sector which is being considered for government support.  
 
 
Exhibit 6  From Science Policy to Industrial Policy  
 
The top bar in the diagram represents a flow of ideas from the public and private sector 
research base towards commercialisation. The direction of flow implies linearity, but 
there are multiple non-linear feedback loops in the process. This is captured by the loops 
in the top bar. The length of time this process may take is captured by the indicative 
timescale across the top of the diagram. It is important to note that the time scales over 
which the process operates may vary significantly from sector to sector and technology 
to technology. The conventional breakdown of policy into science policy, technology 
policy, and innovation policy is shown beneath the development arrow bar. Industrial 
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policy (and in particular selective industrial policy as conventionally defined) is shown as 
primarily focussing on policy support for the sectors in which the new products and 
processes are commercial developed and implemented.  
In the middle of the diagram is a funnel which represents the process in which emerging 
ideas from the science base are gradually narrowed down as they proceed towards 
commercialisation in a particular sector or sectors. This funnel is shown as an “open” 
innovation funnel (Chesborough, 2003, 2006) with inward and outward flows of ideas 
and resources in the development process. The potential for unexpected development 
and spin-off opportunities is represented by the arrows emerging from the funnel whilst 
inputs and complementary investments from potential adopters or users of the 
technology are represented by inward arrows. The openness of the innovation process 
itself may of course vary from sector to sector and in the different stages along the 
overall innovation process.  
The iterative evolutionary process from research to economic effects and the open 
innovation funnel will typically involve multiple investments beyond the original public 
and private sector research investments. The transition from early stage activities funded 
by the public sector to final commercialisation will, in particular require private sector 
investments which are usually many multiples of the original science base investment.  
The bottom third of the diagram represents a schematic overview of a systems approach 
to policy. It shows on the right hand side of the diagram a sectoral systems approach 
looking backwards to technologies from sectors. This shows, as important pull factors, 
lead customers in both the public and private sectors. The technological systems 
approach is represented on the left side of the diagram. It represents the selection of 
technologies to support on the pathway to development and innovation in existing or 
new sectors. This selective approach is identified as choosing races and placing bets 
rather than picking winners.  
The implications for policy are shown under the heading of industrial strategy which is 
shown as an integrative policy process spanning the sectoral and technological systems 
approaches Understanding value chains is shown as central to this policy process. It 
informs the choice of both technology races to enter and sectors to support. This 
requires a granular approach to policy rooted in the specifics of particular technologies 
and the way value is created and captured4.  
The technology support process is also to be understood as one in which the support 
provided is to be seen as an option to invest more, or to withdraw. At each stage of the 
process of development policy support should therefore be designed so far as possible 
to allow an options approach. Advances through the path to commercialisation leads to 
the discovery of new technical and commercial knowledge and this must be used to 
revise planned support. In this way initial investments have the opportunity to be topped 
up or modified as developments show potential promise whilst “honourable dead-ends” 
may cease to receive support for further stages of development5. 
                                            
4
 See for example CST (2007) 
5
 On discovery driven planning in uncertain projects see McGrath and MacMillan (2009) and for real options and 
related stage gate models of assessing progress in uncertain projects see Cooper (2008),  
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The final key policy element shown in the diagram is diffusion. Policy design should 
encourage the entry of potential users along the development path and also the diffusion 
of innovations across firms in the sectors where implementation occurs6 
                                            
6
 For an analysis of a number of intermediate technology organisations which represent variations across countries in 
policy design incorporating the elements of Exhibit 6 to different degrees see Mina et al. (2009). 
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13. Industrial Policy in the UK 
13.1 Learning from the Past 
Although there are many examples of successful industrial policies in developed 
economies (Chang et al, 2013) ‘Industrial Policy’ has long had a bad press in the UK. 
There is a good reason for this, namely, the policy failures of the 1960s and, especially, 
the 1970s. It is salutary to remember this episode since it would be very unfortunate to 
repeat these mistakes. Although the widely recognized failures of that period relate to 
selective policies, there were also serious flaws in the design of horizontal policies. 
Selective industrial policy in the 1970s focused on support for firms and industries 
including through subsidies and nationalization and was a mixture of ‘defensive’ and 
‘strategic’, although skewed to the former. Although 'picking winners' may have been the 
aspiration, "it was losers like Rolls Royce, British Leyland and Alfred Herbert who picked 
Ministers" (Morris and Stout, 1985, p. 873). There was a very clear tendency for 
subsidies to be skewed towards relatively few industries, notably aircraft, shipbuilding 
and, latterly, motor vehicles (Wren, 1996a). The high expenditure on shipbuilding is 
striking since this was clearly an industry in which the UK no longer had a comparative 
advantage in the face of Asian competition. More generally, there was quite a strong 
bias towards shoring up ailing industries which is well reflected in the portfolio of 
holdings of the National Enterprise Board (Wren, 1996b), in the pattern of tariff 
protection across sectors (Greenaway and Milner, 1994), and also in nationalized 
industries where the prevalence of very poor rates of return reflected a lack of political 
will to eliminate productive inefficiency (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
Policies to subsidize British high-technology industries with a view to increasing world 
market share in sectors where supernormal profits might be obtained were notably 
unsuccessful in this period in a number of cases including civil aircraft (which by 1974 
had cost £1.5 billion at 1974 prices for a return of £0.14 billion (Gardner, 1976)), 
computers (Hendry, 1989) and nuclear power (Cowan, 1990). A combination of 
subsidies to American producers linked to defence spending and the relatively small 
size of the British market undermined these attempts at rent-switching. Contrary to 
popular perception, however, there actually were some successes, notably in 
pharmaceuticals and aerospace.  
In pharmaceuticals one major impact of government may have been through the drug-
purchasing policies of the NHS. The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) 
has shaped the incentives facing pharmaceutical companies. This provided a distinctive 
form of rate of return regulation which could be manipulated by the Department of 
Health to encourage R&D in the UK (Thomas, 1994). Even so, a more important aspect 
of government support may well have been through the science base and, in particular, 
the existence of elite research universities with world-class departments together with 
public funding for research through the Medical Research Council.  
In aerospace Rolls-Royce was nationalized in 1971 and successfully privatized in 1987. 
This saved a company that had made a disastrous error in signing a fixed price contract 
to supply the RB-211 engine to Lockheed, a decision which bankrupted it when 
development and production costs rose far above initial estimates. Eventually, the sale 
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of Rolls-Royce realized £1.36bn for the government compared with net subsidies of 
£0.83bn over the previous 20 years and Rolls-Royce went on to become the highly-
profitable, second largest producer of civil-aircraft engines in the world (Lazonick and 
Prencipe, 2005).  
Several failures in horizontal industrial policies in the 1960s and 1970s also deserve a 
mention. First, investment subsidies, which amounted to about 10% of fixed investment 
at their peak in 1978, represented very poor value for money. The econometric evidence 
is that they had little effect on the volume of investment over the long run (Sumner, 
1999) with the implication that there was a massive deadweight cost. Second, the UK 
spent heavily on R&D; at 2.3 per cent of GDP in 1964 this was second only to the 
United States and a high fraction was government financed. Unfortunately, this seems 
to have been badly directed and to have had little impact on productivity performance. 
Ergas (1987) summed up British policy as much too concerned with trying to produce 
radical innovations and too little aimed at effective technology transfer. Third, the 
persistence of protectionism and the weakness of competition policy undermined 
productivity performance by underwriting managerial failure and dysfunctional industrial 
relations (Crafts, 2012). Finally, the tax system was characterized by very high marginal 
direct tax rates such that Tanzi (1969) described it as the least conducive to growth of 
any of the countries in his study. 
After the election of the Thatcher government in 1979, the stance of supply side policy 
changed markedly. Selective industrial policies were phased out, horizontal policies 
were downsized and narrowed in scope with the ending of most investment and 
employment subsidies, while competition in product markets was strengthened 
considerably, initially through reducing trade barriers and deregulation rather than by 
strengthening anti-trust policy. Privatization, reform of industrial relations, and 
restructuring taxation were the new priorities. By 1987/8 grant-equivalent expenditure on 
industrial subsidies which had peaked at £8.9bn (1980 prices) in 1970/1 had fallen to 
£0.4bn (Wren, 1996a). 
Selective industrial policy fell out of favour partly because the 1970s experience led to 
disillusionment and partly because international treaties and, in particular, EU rules on 
state aids constrained policy. Department for Trade and Industry expenditure on 
industrial policy measures was £421.4 million in 1997/8 (prior to devolution) of which 
£121.9m was on science and technology schemes, £171.3m for support for small firms, 
and £128.2m on regional policy, almost all of which went on Regional Selective 
Assistance (Wren, 2001). Whereas in 1981/6 state aids were 3.8 per cent of 
manufacturing GDP by 1994/6 this had fallen to 0.9 per cent.  
The changes that Labour made after its landslide victory in 1997 were to strengthen 
some aspects of horizontal industrial policies with a new emphasis on R&D, investing in 
public capital, strengthening competition policy, and a long term strategic commitment to 
public education and science base expenditure. Only in 2009, in the throes of the 
financial crisis, was there an announcement of rebalancing of industrial policy towards a 
somewhat more selective approach with New Industry, New Jobs (BERR, 2009). 
Nevertheless virtually all (91%) of state aid to industry in 2006 was for horizontal rather 
than selective policies (Buigues and Sekkat, 2011).  
The most obvious improvement in horizontal policies from the 1970s was to increase 
competition across much of the economy through the abandonment of protectionism, 
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entry into the Single Market, deregulation and, ultimately, a strengthening of competition 
policy through new legislation in 1998 and 2002. These changes had positive effects on 
productivity performance (Criscuolo et al., 2004; Griffith, 2001; Proudman and Redding, 
1998). The 1980s and 1990s also saw major changes in industrial relations prompted by 
high unemployment and trade-union legislation but pushed forward by stronger 
competition which promoted changes in working practices (Machin and Wadhwani, 
1989; Gregg et al., 1993). 
In other important respects, horizontal policies were less satisfactory and reflect 
regulatory failure government failure or, at least, political constraints. Four areas where 
this has been apparent are energy and water regulation, transport infrastructure, land-
use planning, and the structure of taxation. The privatisation of the water and energy 
sectors and the subsequent regulatory frameworks put in place led to chronic under-
investment in R&D weakened innovation and in the case of energy reduced the UK’s 
technological and commercial capacity in nuclear generation (Cave 2009 CST 2005, 
CST 2009a). More generally from a growth perspective, the UK has been investing too 
little in infrastructure (CST 2009b). To maintain the level of public capital to GDP at a 
growth-maximizing level, investment of about 2.7 per cent of GDP would be needed 
(Kamps, 2005) but the average since 1997 has only been about half of this while the 
major investment in road building justified by the Eddington Report (2006) has not been 
made. The LSE Growth Commission (2013) has argued that failures in the institutional 
architecture need urgently to be addressed to deal with this issue. Land-use planning 
regulation creates massive allocative inefficiency and reduces labour productivity both 
by making land unduly expensive and by restricting city size which means that 
agglomeration economies are foregone and spatial adjustment is impeded – successful 
British cities are too small (Leunig and Overman, 2008). One of the implications is an 
implicit regulatory tax rate of around 300 per cent which makes office space in cities like 
Leeds and Manchester much more expensive than even New York and San Francisco 
(Cheshire and Hilber, 2008). The Mirrlees Review made a powerful case for tax reforms 
which it claimed would have significant positive effects on the level of GDP and its 
growth rate. The key it argued is to reduce personal and, especially, corporate income 
tax paid for by raising consumption and property taxes. The proposals made include 
implementing a land-value tax, ending exemptions from VAT, and making a normal rate 
of return non-taxable (Mirrlees et al., 2011).  
The overall trajectory of UK industrial policy since the 1970s is perhaps best described 
as seeking to improve the workings of a liberal market economy (LME). In particular, the 
emphasis on strengthening competition and industrial relations reform has worked in 
this direction. The contrast with the earlier (failed) experiments of the 1960s and 1970s 
that sought to introduce a version of ‘corporatism’ into the UK economy is quite striking. 
The liberal market competition-focussed policy from the 1980s onwards was 
accompanied by persistently higher levels of unemployment compared to earlier 
decades. This led to major public sector policy expenditures to promote small and 
medium sized enterprises as the key ingredient in the recipe for job creation and 
increased attention to innovation as a source of productivity growth. 
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13.2 From Industrial Policy to Enterprise and Innovation Policy  
 Enterprise policy is designed to promote the small and medium sized enterprise (SME) 
sector (defined as those businesses employing less than 250 people). The promotion of 
enterprise was initially linked to the belief that SMEs were to be the primary generators 
of employment and jobs. Later initiatives focused in addition on the promotion of 
technology intensive SMEs and spin offs to promote commercialization from the science 
base as part of a more general shift of emphasis to innovation policy.  
The shift in policy emphasis towards the promotion of innovation  has frequently involved 
both direct grants and elements of selectivity based on sectors or technologies.  
A range of systems-inspired innovation-related policies were reinforced or introduced 
from the 1990’s onwards as a result of a series of innovation policy reviews (DTI, 1998; 
DTI, 2003a; DIUS, 2008; BIS, 2011). These systems policies focused on networked and 
collaborative connections both between businesses and between businesses and the 
science base. These were often linked to specific technological systems, e.g. 
biotechnology or nanotechnology. System connections within specific geographical 
localities were also emphasised in the identification and promotion of innovation clusters 
(DTI, 2003b). In relation to innovation inputs R&D tax credits were introduced in 2000 for 
small firms and extended to larger firms in 2002. 
The review of innovation policy in 2003 (DTI, 2003a) led to a rationalization of innovation 
policy support. Its delivery was transferred to a non-departmental executive agency, the 
Technology Strategy Board (TSB). The central policy ‘products’ under its domain 
included the Collaborative Grant for R&D (linking large and small firms and the science 
base), Knowledge Transfer Partnerships (linking SMEs and Higher Education Institutions 
(HEIs) through co-funded postgraduate placements), and Knowledge Transfer Networks 
(linking businesses in a sector)7. TSB programmes and initiatives have frequently 
selected sectoral or technological approaches. 
At the same time here were also major changes in funding the science base. In 2001 the 
Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF) was introduced. This was intended as an extra 
“Third-Stream” of support for English HEIs. It was to sit alongside the Dual Support 
streams of Research Councils and Higher Education Funding Councils to promote 
business-industry links. In 2004, following the Lambert Review of Business-University 
Collaboration (HM Treasury, 2003), the Science and Innovation Investment framework 
2004-2014 was launched. It included a long term commitment to increase public sector 
R&D faster than the rate of GDP growth. Assuming this was matched by the private 
sector this was designed to raise the overall UK R&D to GDP ratio from 1.9% in 2004 to 
                                            
7
 Another long running innovation policy scheme the Small Firms Merit Award for Technology (SMART) offering 
grants for early stage technology projects was in 2004 relabelled the Grant for R&D and devolved to the Regional 
Development Agencies. It also began with the targeting of specific technologies on sectors. Following the subsequent 
demise of the RDAs it was re-labelled SMART and re-launched under the auspices of TSB in 2011. In 2012 the TSB 
was also given responsibility for the launch and management of the “Catapult” intermediate technology organizations 
linking businesses and HEIs in selected technology and sectoral domains. 
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2.5% by 2014. It was accompanied by a range of measures designed to upgrade the 
HEI capital stock and to place HEI research funding on a full economic cost basis.  
The most recent developments in policy (BIS, 2011) have been associated with the 
recognition of the importance of establishing a richer set of institutional interconnections 
between universities and the business community and the development of sectoral and 
technological strategies. This has included the development of a set of “Catapult” 
centres focused around a selected set of themes and technologies. This followed a 
review of practices in other countries and under the auspices of the Technology Strategy 
Board has led to the creation of seven catapult centres once again selectively focused 
on a range of sectoral or technological domains (Hauser, 2010; TSB, 2011). Finally the 
use in the United States of the public procurement of R&D from SMEs through the Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Programme has been imitated in the UK.  
Policy towards start-ups and SMEs included experimentation with a wide range of 
measures designed to meet capital market failures in the provision of risk capital and 
loan finance for SMEs as well labour market failures in the provision of SME training. 
The idea that SMEs are generally finance constrained because of capital market failures 
is wide spread. As a result most countries including the UK have a variety of loan 
guarantee and other support schemes to ameliorate capital market finance failures. It is 
clear that in periods of financial crises, such as in 1991 and 2008, smaller businesses 
report difficulties in obtaining access to finance or, in periods of high interest rates, 
complain about the price of such finance. Outside of these periods, however, the 
evidence suggests that UK SMEs in general obtains nearly all the finance they seek and 
that this comes primarily from banks. A particular difficulty in estimating financial 
constraints in times of financial instability and recession is that it is difficult to distinguish 
a lack of borrowing because the lenders are unwilling to lend or because the borrowers 
have lost the appetite to borrow in difficult financial circumstances (Armstrong et al., 
2013; Cosh et al., 2010). Evidence of financial constraints for particular groups of SMEs, 
such as those involved in the relatively risky knowledge intensive or R&D intensive 
businesses, is more persuasive and has led to the introduction of a variety of innovation 
and R&D related policies. These include support for firms such as direct grant support 
and tax credits for R&D, alongside support for investors such tax breaks on capital gains 
and for investments in early stage and technology intensive businesses. Pressure for yet 
more support persists (Breedon, 2012; House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee 2013a, 2013b; Small Business Task Force, 2013).  
The burgeoning of small business support across multiple departments and policy 
measures from the 1980s onwards meant that by 2003-4 it was estimated that the sector 
was receiving nearly £8bn in support (roughly £220 per person of working age in the UK) 
(Hughes, 2010). This support included £3.6bn of foregone revenue through tax breaks 
(reduced corporation tax rates, VAT small traders exemption, SME R&D tax credit 
Enterprise Investment Scheme Venture Capital Trusts). It also included £1.7bn of 
training and skills subsidy. A relatively small amount (£425 million) was associated with 
the then DTI innovation policy support which included the TSB policy weapons 
discussed above (PACEC, 2006). The retreat from industrial policy has thus been 
associated with a massive commitment of resources to support ‘enterprise
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13.3 Learning from Enterprise and Innovation Policy 
It is difficult to measure the extent to which manufacturing as a whole has benefitted 
from the horizontal and selective support activity for enterprise and innovation. Nor is it 
easy to assess the overall effects on the SMEs sector as a whole of the overall degree 
of subsidy. However the R&D intensity of manufacturing compared to the other sectors; 
the emphasis on commercializing engineering and physical sciences, and identification 
of certain manufacturing and “high-tech” sectors in SMART and TSB activity has meant 
that the sector has probably been a disproportionate recipient of innovation policy 
support.  
In relation to SME support policy generally, Hughes (2010) compares size sector and 
age matched samples of SMEs in 1991, 1997 and 2004 and concludes that there was 
little change in the proportions exporting, innovating or training over the period. Rates of 
collaboration with HEIs were however higher in 2004 than earlier years. Outside of 
periods of macro-financial crisis there was no sign of market failures in access to 
finance. SMEs typically obtained the funding they sought (see also Cosh et al., 2007). 
There have been numerous evaluations of schemes to underwrite loan guarantees and 
to support venture capital. A useful recent review of these schemes (Ramlogan and 
Rigby, 2012) concludes that, in the case of the UK, schemes such as the loan guarantee 
scheme show positive effects, but that schemes supporting venture capital have a much 
weaker track record.  
There are severe problems in evaluating the impact of innovation policies. First, the 
outcomes may take many years to appear. Second, the outcomes are typically heavily 
skewed with about 10% of the “treated” firms accounting for 70-80% of all the gains from 
a scheme, and third, there are problems of good firms being selected into the scheme 
which would have done well anyway compared to control group firms who weren’t 
“treated” (see e.g. Hughes and Martin 2012).  
A number of evaluations of the innovation policy schemes discussed above have 
nevertheless been made using methods which attempt to address these issues. 
Compared to the analyses of selective and other horizontal policies, the outcomes are 
more favourable and suggest a positive impact for policy intervention. 
An econometric analysis of the impact of the SMART scheme on Total Factor 
Productivity yielded no significant effects (Harris and Robinson 2004) but a series of 
other evaluations combining case studies with econometrics and exploring skewness 
found a range of positive effects. These were concentrated in a small proportion of firms 
taking part in the schemes. These included positive impacts on sales, employment, 
access to other resources and ability to meet the firms’ technical innovative and 
business objectives (PACEC 2001, 2011).  
The Knowledge Transfer Partnership Scheme has supported over 5,000 partnerships. 
Around 60% of firms reported that their technical objectives were met and around 40% 
that their commercial objectives were met. In the period 2001-2 and 2007-8 between 
5550 and 6010 net additional jobs were created generating around £1.7billion gross 
value added (of which the 25% most successful businesses accounted for 70%). This 
represented additional gross value added of between £4.70 and £5.20 per £1 
government support (Segal Quince Wicksteed, 2002; Regeneris Consulting, 2010).  
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The Collaborative Grant for R&D has been estimated to have generated substantial 
behavioural additionality in terms of business and HEI processes for managing 
collaboration relationships and innovation. In addition since 2004, it was estimated to 
generate 13,350 net additional jobs and £2.9 billion additional gross value added. For 
each £1 of grant there was £6.71 of additional gross value added (PACEC, 2011).  
The HEIF funding stream led to the injection of  £592 million extra funding into the 
university sector between 2001 and 2007. This was estimated to have yielded between 
£2.9billion and £4.2 billion gross additional knowledge exchange income which 
universities attracted from business and other external user sources (PACEC/CBR, 
2009). 
In relation to the overall policy spend on direct and indirect (tax based) innovation and 
SMEs, Foreman-Peck (2013) shows that in the period 2002-4 SMEs which received 
innovation policy support (either directly through e.g. SMART or indirectly through R&D 
tax credits) were more likely to innovate than other businesses. Innovating businesses 
also grew faster than other businesses. His estimates suggest that SME innovation 
support policy cost £320 million p.a. in 2002-4 and yielded a return of £1,180 million p.a. 
in 2002 prices. He notes that the cost of R&D tax credit support was significantly higher 
than the other direct innovation support and that the R&D tax credit has a much smaller 
take up. As a result he concludes that ‘much of the return to innovation could apparently 
be earned without the expensive tax credit’ (Foreman-Peck, 2013, p68). In addition, a 
recent qualitative study HMRC (2010) focusing on business decision-making processes 
in relation to R&D tax credits and grants concluded that the R&D tax credits were almost 
always described by firms in the sample as a “bonus”. They had little if any effect on 
decisions to conduct individual pieces of R&D work. On the other hand, grants, such as 
SMART, appeared to be crucial to start-up companies in particular and in the early 
stages of the life of research-based SMEs. The application process for a grant induced 
indirect benefits in terms of the discipline involved in putting together the proposal. The 
grants also exerted a leveraging effect on other funding by providing “kudos” for the 
company. It also had positive effects on staff recruitment and retention. This suggests 
that tax credits are a relatively inefficient way to supporting SME innovation activity. 
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14. Industrial policy, the Challenge of 
Globalization and the ‘Second 
Unbundling’ 
Globalization entails reductions in trade costs and increased international mobility of 
capital. A major implication is that the relative attractiveness of locations that business 
chooses for different stages of production in the value chain including manufacturing 
may change over time. Indeed, a notable feature of the past quarter century has been 
the rapid expansion of ‘vertically-specialized’ trade where value added to the final 
product sold to the consumer has been built-up in a series of different locations perhaps 
in several countries (Yi, 2003). Linked to this has been the so-called ‘2nd Unbundling’ in 
which technological change, especially in terms of ICT, has made it possible to disperse 
production stages that previously had to be performed in close proximity (Baldwin, 
2006). 
These developments have implications that change the optimal composition of industrial 
policies compared with the less globalized world in the earlier technological era of the 
1970s (Baldwin and Evenett, 2012). First, with regard to selective industrial policies, it 
may be necessary to re-think the notion of giving support to particular manufacturing 
sectors and think instead in terms of interventions targeted at stages of production in a 
value chain. Second, the increased mobility of some factors of production means that it 
may be important not only to consider externalities but how far these will be internalized 
to the UK. This means that compared with earlier times, the weight of subsidy should tilt 
towards ‘high-spillover, low-mobility’ factors – for example, horizontal policies should 
emphasize human capital rather than transferable technology. Third, corporate taxation 
has to be designed for a world in which there is greater tax competition which typically 
implies lower marginal rates than in a closed-economy setting. 
Perhaps most important of all is to recognize the value of increasing the ‘stickiness’ of 
economic activity by making alternative locations less good substitutes. This results 
from advantages that cannot easily be replicated elsewhere. In particular, this suggests 
that policies to nurture successful agglomerations deserve a high priority. It may be 
appropriate for the British government to follow the lead of the Dutch (CPB, 2010) and 
consider what a successful portfolio of British cities would look like in future and how this 
can be underpinned. This calls for an approach different from that of traditional industrial 
policy with its emphasis on subsidies to physical investment or promoting particular 
manufacturing industries. Instead, it will be important to develop well-designed transport 
infrastructure and land-use planning policies. Unfortunately, these are areas in which 
British policies leave a lot to be desired. 
Increased international mobility of capital also entails ‘tax competition’. As corporate tax 
rates are lowered in other countries, a policy response may be required from the UK in 
order to maintain its attractiveness for FDI. The prediction of simplistic models of tax 
competition is that there will be a ‘race to the bottom’ and corporate tax rates will tend to 
zero (Razin and Sadka, 1991). This has not happened because, in practice, capital is 
only imperfectly mobile even in the manufacturing sector and its choice of location is 
influenced by other factors besides taxation. Small countries, for example, Ireland and 
Luxembourg, find it attractive to cut tax rates because their domestic capital stock is 
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relatively small because the increase in the tax base compensates for the lower tax rate. 
For larger countries such as Germany and the UK, this is not the case, while political 
constraints and considerations of fairness mean that, in any case, for these countries, 
cuts in corporate taxes will be relatively limited (Plumper et al., 2009). This implies that if 
policymakers are concerned to combat tax competition they will need to focus on 
instruments that aim to improve human capital, the regulatory environment and 
infrastructure. 
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15. Institutional Architecture and the 
Future of Industrial Policy 
We are proposing a different system based approach to medium to long-term industrial 
policy to that on which past UK policy has been based. There are nevertheless 
important lessons to be learned from past UK experience. These relate in particular to 
the ability of governments to design and deliver policy. This is a question of government 
failure. A systems approach might address these issues in four ways. First, there is a 
need for policy to be designed in an embedded way which eschews top down design 
and implementation. Second, in the face of uncertainty and the need for reflexive policy 
learning, an options approach would be essential. Third, there would be a requirement 
to build policy design and information processing capacity. Finally it would embody the 
creation and design of policy intermediaries to enhance the connectedness of the 
system and improve its institutional architecture.  
We have discussed each of these in earlier sections. Here we address a final and 
central problem relating to the provision of an institutional architecture that will ensure 
longer term stability in policy design and implementation. Exhibit 7 summarises a recent 
proposal to address this problem in relation to UK infrastructure while Exhibit 8 provides 
examples of relevant institutions from the UK, Australia and the USA. 
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Exhibit 7 The Institutional Architecture for Investment in Infrastructure 
The need to improve infrastructure provision in the UK is urgent – as it has been for many years. This is a 
clear example of government failure which is costly to UK manufacturing. Among the obvious problems 
are: 
 Difficulty in basing decisions on unbiased appraisals as opposed to lobbying 
 The appeal of ‘grand projects’ to vote-seeking politicians 
 Vulnerability to policy instability 
 The chronic NIMBYism created by the planning system and incentives to local politicians to oppose projects 
that have high value for the nation 
These systemic weaknesses have led the LSE Growth Commission (2013) to propose a new institutional 
architecture to govern infrastructure strategy, delivery and finance. This is described in the diagram below. 
Infrastructure Strategy Board 
 
                  Strategic Advice                                                 Policy Goals 
 
Parliament and Government 
 
    Policy Framework                                                                                National Policy 
                                                                                                                     Statements 
                                                      
                            Infrastructure            Independent Planning  
                            Bank                           Commission 
 
The Infrastructure Strategy Board (ISB) has the key function of providing independent expert advice. It 
would gather evidence, consult with the public and provide analysis of costs and benefits of policy options 
and provide regular reports on infrastructure needs and long-term priorities and challenges. Its mandate 
would be laid down by statute and it would be accountable to parliament. It would be governed by an 
independent management board. 
The Independent Planning Commission would be charged with delivering on the ISB’s strategic 
priorities and would not require ministerial approval for projects. It is designed to give predictability and 
effectiveness to investment. 
The Infrastructure Bank is to facilitate the provision of stable, long-term, predictable and mostly private-
sector finance for infrastructure to reduce policy risk and to structure finance in ways that share risk 
efficiently. 
The overall design is intended to facilitate long-term planning and reduce policy instability. It allows the 
government to choose its priorities and decide on strategy but it would ensure that political decisions are 
taken in the right place and represent credible commitments for investors.  
For further details see: 
www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndexpertise/units/growthCommission/documents/pdf/SecretariatPapers/ 
Binfrastructure.pdf  
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Exhibit 8  Examples of Oversight and Strategic Policy Institutions 
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
The OBR is an independent fiscal watchdog that became a statutory body in April 2011 as a result 
of the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act. 
The OBR examines and reports on the sustainability of the public finances. It was set up with the 
strict instruction to provide only positive commentary, not normative commentary, on government 
policies. The Act gives the OBR right of access to Government information it may require for the 
performance of its duty, in addition to access to relevant officials and others.  
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was created between the OBR and those government 
departments with which it interacts most, namely the HM Treasury, HM Revenue and Customs and 
the Department for Work and Pensions. This is not a legally binding agreement but provides details 
of the working relationship between these four institutions. The OBR has an annual budget of 
£1.775m, a dedicated staff of 18 civil servants and three committee members (Chote, 2013). 
Advanced Manufacturing National Programme Office (AMNPO), United States 
Hosted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), AMNPO is staffed by 
representatives from federal agencies with manufacturing-related missions as well as fellows from 
manufacturing businesses and universities.  
Recommended by the Advanced Manufacturing Partnership Steering Committee and endorsed by 
the President’s Council of Advisers on Science and Technology (Advanced Manufacturing 
Partnership Steering Committee, 2012), AMNPO is charged with implementing a whole of 
government advanced manufacturing initiative to facilitate collaboration across federal agencies; 
and convening and enabling private-public partnerships focused on manufacturing innovation and 
engaging U.S. universities. 
By coordinating resources and programmes, AMNPO will enhance technology transfer and help 
businesses overcome technical obstacles to scaling up production of new technologies. 
The Australian Productivity Commission 
The Productivity Commission, created in 1998, is the Australian Government's independent 
research and advisory body on a range of economic, social and environmental issues affecting the 
welfare of Australians. 
It is an advisory body and does not administer government programs or exercise executive power. 
Its contribution hinges on the value of the independent advice and information it provides. 
Its operating principles include Independence (The Commission operates under the powers of its 
own legislation, with its own budgetary allocation and permanent staff, and reports formally through 
the Treasurer to the Australian Parliament); transparency: and taking a community-wide perspective 
(Australian Productivity Commission, 2013). 
 
In the light of these examples the establishment of an Office for Manufacturing for the 
UK may be one way of encouraging stability industrial policy design and implementation.  
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16. The Office for Manufacturing (OfM) 
Future industrial policy will play a key role in how the government seeks to capture 
future value from the manufacturing sector. This would be best achieved by  a holistic 
systems perspective, addressing both market and systems failures and spanning the 
domains of economic, science, technology and innovation policy. To implement this 
approach, it is critical that the Government has, in the future, an institutional architecture 
with the capacity to deliver industrial policy in the medium to long-term.  
One way to do this could be  to introduce an ‘Office for Manufacturing’ with challenge, 
coordination, and evaluation functions for future industrial policy in order to ensure 
future policies work effectively to strengthen industry and rebalance the economy.  
The remit of the OfM would be: 
 To scrutinise industrial policy and support its coordination: The OfM will facilitate 
coordination across departments for existing and proposed industrial policies, and 
will work with other departments to seek out beneficial opportunities for coordinated 
action. 
 To evaluate the impact of industrial policy: This would include ongoing analysis of 
data and policy outcomes, to support the development and implementation of future 
policies. 
 To provide an audit function by producing an annual report on manufacturing in the 
UK. This would include analysis of manufacturing data using current Standard 
Industrial Classification and wider metrics including manufacturing services as 
advocated earlier. The report would be produced against the long term science and 
innovation investment framework. 
 To support long-term progress being made against the challenges for Government 
set out in the Foresight, Future of Manufacturing report: Work to be refreshed every 
five years. 
 
Given the cross governmental role of the OfM, it would be most appropriate for it to 
report to the Chancellor or a Cabinet Office Minister, potentially the Minister for the 
Cabinet Office or the Minister for Government Policy. To support its cross-Government 
role, it would be appropriate for the small team of staff to be drawn from across 
Government, with oversight provided by a handful of independent Commissioners. 
It is likely that an Act of Parliament would be needed to establish the OfM, which was 
the case when the OBR was established. This included the following:  
“Right of access (at any reasonable time) to all Government information which 
it may reasonably require for the performance of its duty….Entitled to require 
from any person holding or accountable for any government information any 
assistance or explanation which the Office reasonably thinks necessary for that 
purpose”. 
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) would need to be in place between those 
departments which the OfM interacts most frequently. 
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